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Abstract
In the extant vertical integration literature, the question of how the firm’s portfolio of
outsourced work is managed across suppliers has been relatively understudied. We seek to
advance this area of research by examining factors that influence how concentrated the firm’s
outsourcing is among its set of suppliers. Using data on the outsourcing of patent legal
services, we find empirical evidence that outsourced knowledge−based service work is
concentrated in the hands of fewer suppliers when: (1) it requires greater firm−specific
knowledge; (2) there is a higher level of interrelatedness across outsourced projects; (3) the
firm’s reliance on outsourcing is high; (4) its outsourced projects are focused on a narrower
(capability) domain; and (5) the technological dynamism of this domain is low. Our study
suggests that examining portfolio−level phenomena in outsourcing is a useful complement to
the predominant focus on transaction−level outcomes in prior research because it provides
insights into how firms manage tradeoffs across their entire set of outsourced projects.
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ABSTRACT 
In the extant vertical integration literature, the question of how the firm’s portfolio of outsourced work is 
managed across suppliers has been relatively understudied. We seek to advance this area of research by 
examining factors that influence how concentrated the firm’s outsourcing is among its set of suppliers. Using 
data on the outsourcing of patent legal services, we find empirical evidence that outsourced knowledge-based 
service work is concentrated in the hands of fewer suppliers  when: (1) it requires greater firm-specific 
knowledge; (2) there is a higher level of interrelatedness across outsourced projects; (3) the firm’s reliance on 
outsourcing is high; (4) its outsourced projects are focused on a narrower (capability) domain; and (5) the 
technological dynamism of this domain is low. Our study suggests that examining portfolio-level phenomena 
in outsourcing is a useful complement to the predominant focus on transaction-level outcomes in prior 





The vertical integration literature has developed a number of important insights concerning when and 
why firms engage in strategic outsourcing. With outsourcing becoming more widespread and with suppliers 
playing a more critical role in a firm’s success, research attention has shifted to strategic issues related to 
supplier management. In this spirit, the current paper examines how firms configure their suppliers at the 
portfolio level as a key dimension of supplier management requiring both theoretical explanation and empirical 
inquiry. A firm’s outsourcing decisions can usefully be viewed as being made at two interrelated levels – the 
portfolio level and the transaction level. While prior research has provided substantial insights into outsourcing 
and supplier management at the transaction level, research focused on portfolio-level questions – e.g., how 
much to outsource, how many and which suppliers to include, and how to distribute work among suppliers – 
has been much more limited. Examining outsourcing at the portfolio level incorporates the understanding that 
a firm’s set of transactions, which comprise its outsourcing portfolio, can exhibit significant interdependencies 
(Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999; Kang, Mahoney & Tan, 2009; Mayer, 2006)  and  may  need to be examined 
collectively.  Therefore,  research  at the portfolio level can provide  a more complete understanding of 
outsourcing, including important new insights for both theory and practice.  
In this paper, our research interest is in explaining and predicting how a firm – in response to shifting 
supplier management imperatives – may change the allocation of its portfolio of outsourced activities among 
its suppliers. For example, between 2001 and 2006 Cisco reduced its total number of suppliers from about 
1,500 to 600 (Shao & Lee, 2009).
i  In 2001, the company spent 80% of its outsourcing dollars with 200 
suppliers, but by 2006 its outsourcing had become much more focused, with just 95 suppliers accounting for 
90% of Cisco’s outsourcing dollars (Carbone, 2006). Thus, the strategic shift in Cisco’s outsourcing practices 
consisted of a reduction in the number of its suppliers and a simultaneous increase in the proportion of work 
outsourced to some select suppliers. The cumulative effect of these changes was an increased “concentration 
of outsourcing-shares” among the firm’s suppliers, which we label supply portfolio concentration.  
Why then might firms want to increase their supply portfolio concentration, and outsource to fewer 
suppliers? After all, distributing a firm’s outsourcing among multiple suppliers can reduce its dependence on 
any single supplier, increase bargaining power,  and enable price and capability benchmarking between  
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suppliers. Consider Cisco’s motivations for its strategic shift towards greater supply portfolio concentration – 
the company noted cost and time savings in managing fewer suppliers, the ability to work more closely with 
these suppliers, and the “leverage” it gained with select suppliers, who in turn became more responsive to the 
company’s evolving (market-driven) needs (Carbone, 2006). Furthermore, concentrating outsourcing in a 
smaller set of suppliers may enable each of these suppliers to make relationship-specific investments and to 
gain deeper knowledge of the firm’s unique products, technologies and procedures, and thus provide more 
relevant and higher quality services to the firm (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Importantly, such advantages operate at 
the portfolio level, where relational capital or firm-specific knowledge investments can be leveraged across 
multiple transactions between the firm and its supplier. 
That said, higher levels of supply portfolio concentration may also mean that the firm becomes over-
reliant on a few suppliers, which poses strategic questions concerning how the firm will manage transaction 
hazards, monitor supplier performance, and take advantage of market forces that drive supplier efficiency and 
capability development. In Cisco’s case, for example, the company recognized that it would be deepening its 
relationships and commitments with some chosen suppliers, and that these suppliers needed to be chosen 
carefully based on the range and depth of their technological capabilities.  
These tradeoffs suggest that firms’ supply portfolio choices should reflect the classic tensions between 
coordination and adaptation, which are highlighted in the organization economics literature (e.g., Williamson, 
1985). When outsourcing knowledge-based work, closer exchange relationships with select suppliers can be 
advantageous for incentivizing firm-specific investments, greater responsiveness,  safeguarding sensitive 
information, managing appropriability hazards, accounting for complementarities between projects, and better 
coordination generally with each supplier (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Novak & Stern, 2009). However, focusing on 
fewer suppliers can also be limiting in important ways.  In particular, a high supply portfolio concentration 
may constrain firms in accessing the full breadth of supplier capabilities available through the market 
(Argyres, 1996; Leiblein & Miller, 2003), and in quickly adapting to dynamic environments in which current 
supplier capabilities can become obsolescent (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986). We build on these ideas 
concerning the opposing pressures firms face in managing their outsourcing to develop  theory-driven 
hypotheses about when firms would choose higher (or lower) supply portfolio concentrations.    
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We test our developed hypotheses in the context of outsourced patent prosecution work, namely the 
legal tasks of filing for patents and interacting with the patent office until the patent is granted. Data on patent 
work have a number of unique strengths, and provide a useful context for testing theories about outsourcing in 
knowledge-based services. For example, compilation of information from patent documents and patent 
attorney databases enables us to access detailed data on the characteristics and outsourcing behavior of firms, 
as well as the knowledge attributes of outsourced work. Moreover, the patenting activities of firms are 
composed of large numbers of “work projects” – each centered on a single patent – of roughly similar type, 
which enables hypothesis testing that is not skewed by idiosyncratic or highly heterogeneous projects that 
sometimes characterize outsourcing in other knowledge-based services, such as IT.  Further, the availability of 
these data over time enables us to control for firm characteristics through the use of longitudinal econometric 
techniques, and therefore to obtain more robust empirical results. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Building on the organizational economics literature, outsourcing research has examined several 
aspects of supplier management, such as supplier choice (Hoetker, 2005), contract formulation (Mayer & 
Argyres, 2004), formal and relational governance (Hoetker & Mellewigt, 2009; Poppo & Zenger, 2002), 
concurrent sourcing (Parmigiani, 2007), and the impacts of information technologies (Kim & Mahoney, 2006; 
Lajili & Mahoney, 2006).  However, a critical assumption in much of this prior work – drawing on Williamson 
(1985)  –  is that the transaction is the unit of analysis. It has been recognized for some time now that 
transaction-level analysis can create constraints for developing a complete understanding of outsourcing. One 
limitation is that firm boundary decisions deemed appropriate when considering an individual transaction 
might be constrained by governance choices for other current transactions or prior contractual (or implicit) 
commitments of a firm, leading to governance inseparability (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999). Alternately, 
considerations of a transaction’s potential effect on future transactions in the form of knowledge and 
reputation spillovers (Kang, Mahoney & Tan, 2009; Mayer, 2006) might justify governance choices that may 
otherwise have appeared to be strategic mistakes when viewed with the individual transaction as the unit of 
analysis. Recent research has noted that firm capabilities often arise from prior governance decisions, so 
spillovers between transactions can also occur from the path dependent development and subsequent use of  
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capabilities (Argyres & Zenger, 2011; Mayer, Somaya & Williamson, 2011). Finally, coordination or 
complementarities among transactions might also lead to joint governance choice for a set of transactions 
(Novak & Stern, 2009; Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009). 
The current paper builds on these theoretical advances and extends the organizational economics logic 
of governance inseparability to explain concentration in supply portfolios. Supply portfolio concentration 
(SPC) refers to the extent to which the firm apportions its outsourced activities or projects (of the same type) 
in a more or less concentrated manner among suppliers. High levels of SPC are indicated if most of the firm’s 
outsourcing is to one or very few suppliers, whereas spreading the firm’s outsourcing among a larger number 
of suppliers indicates low SPC. The analogy with an industry’s market-share concentration suggests a natural 
(and robust) way to measure supply portfolio concentration by employing the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index 
(HHI) frequently used in industry analysis.  
Inherently,  a firm’s strategies for supply portfolio management are related to and interact with 
transaction-level choices about which projects it outsources, and which suppliers it outsources individual 
projects to.  However, this paper highlights the novel insights available through analysis at the portfolio level, 
which are often difficult to access through transaction-level analyses. Thus, it takes another step in freeing the 
outsourcing literature from constraints imposed by focusing on the transaction alone as the unit of analysis. 
For example, because investments in firm-specific knowledge and buyer-supplier relational capital can often 
be leveraged across multiple transactions between the same buyer and supplier, the need for these assets 
across the firm’s outsourcing portfolio can influence supplier management in ways that are not captured by 
analysis of any single transaction. Similarly, interrelationships and complementarities between transactions 
within the firm’s portfolio may require coordinated choices across transactions (Novak & Stern, 2009), which 
can influence decision making at the portfolio level. Portfolio-level attributes may also indicate a need for 
greater flexibility and adaptation to environmental conditions across the range of transactions undertaken by 
the firm, and these attributes may drive firms to involve more suppliers and to have less coordination with 
them. Therefore, a related research contribution of the current paper resides in examining the tension between 
coordination-related and adaptation-related factors (Williamson, 1985) that drive supply portfolio choices.  
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Portfolio-level choices about outsourcing are also important in themselves; therefore, one of our 
contributions resides in highlighting these phenomena for research (i.e., in explaining a new type of dependent 
variable). In our hypotheses and empirical analyses below, we develop a number of variables that predict the 
firm’s level of SPC.  Because the firm’s outsourcing portfolio is ultimately comprised of transactions, these 
portfolio-level drivers of SPC are naturally aggregations of transactional attributes. Some of the explanatory 
variables  are simple aggregations (e.g., averages) of transactional attributes (firm-specific knowledge and 
technological dynamism), but other key variables are specifically derived from the composition of, or inter-
relationships between, transactions in the portfolio (interrelatedness, reliance on outsourcing, and domain 
diversity). Thus, an additional research contribution of our study is to develop a series of novel portfolio-level 
variables  –  consisting of simple or complex aggregations of transactional elements –  that may explain 
portfolio-level outsourcing phenomena.  
Changes in supply concentration at the portfolio level may sometimes go hand in hand with changes in 
the governance of outsourcing at the transaction level. Some attributes of the firm’s outsourcing portfolio are 
associated with a more concentrated supply portfolio precisely because they require the development of 
longer-term relational  arrangements with suppliers. Importantly, these portfolio-level drivers of relational 
governance are in addition to any impetus for relational governance based on attributes of the focal transaction 
alone. Moreover, SPC is not always related to the governance of individual transactions in this way. Three 
portfolio-level variables we examine –  namely, firm-specific knowledge, reliance on outsourcing, and 
technological dynamism – influence SPC through the (greater or lesser) need for closer exchange relationships 
with suppliers over time, and can therefore affect governance arrangements at the transaction level. Thus, 
another contribution of the current paper is in identifying portfolio-level characteristics relevant to future 
research on governance choices at the transaction level. 
Additionally, this paper focuses on the outsourcing of knowledge-based services. The overall volume 
of outsourced knowledge work has grown rapidly in the economy, and this sector – consisting of services such 
as IT, accounting, consulting, legal, market research, design and R&D – is now about as large as all of manu-
facturing.
ii Some of our logic may extend to outsourcing in manufacturing as well, particularly in contexts 





In principle, firms may obtain several potential benefits from having a highly fragmented, or less-
concentrated, supplier set. These benefits generally stem from the action of market forces on supply 
relationships, resulting in access to diverse and “best in class” capabilities, greater supplier production cost 
efficiencies, and more bargaining power relative to suppliers. However, identifying and using additional 
suppliers  require investments in searching for and vetting suppliers, negotiating contracts, managing 
relationships, and monitoring, all of which are costly and time-consuming actions.  A greater volume of out-
sourcing enables a firm to spread these costs over multiple outsourced projects. Therefore, as a baseline, one 
may expect firms with higher levels of outsourcing to have a less concentrated (more fragmented) supply set. 
Below, we identify additional factors that may affect supply portfolio concentration (SPC) beyond the baseline 
effect of the volume of outsourcing. 
Firm-Specific Knowledge  
This paper posits that if the firm’s outsourced knowledge-based work needs greater firm-specific 
knowledge on average across its entire portfolio, it will result in higher SPC. When knowledge-based projects 
are closely related to a unique technology, organizational unit, or strategic niche that is specific to a firm, 
acquisition of firm-specific knowledge by the supplier becomes imperative for effective task performance 
(Williamson, 1985). Firm-specific knowledge investments are required to understand the firm’s needs in the 
focal activity, and to coordinate effectively with its managers and employees (Madsen, Mosakowski & Zaheer, 
2003; Nickerson & Zenger, 2004), which represents a condition of high human asset specificity (Helfat, 1994). 
Suppliers are thus required to make investments in knowledge that are only valuable for servicing the needs of 
a particular firm and cannot be redeployed to alternative usages and alternative users without sacrifice of the 
productive value (Ghemawat & del Sol, 1998). When firm-specific knowledge is more valuable across the set 
of transactions outsourced by the firm, a supplier can  potentially  reuse such knowledge across multiple 
transactions outsourced by the firm.  In turn, firms can induce suppliers to make firm-specific knowledge 
investments by assuring them a larger share of outsourcing and limiting ex post competition between suppliers 
by reducing the number of suppliers. For example, Dell was able to reach agreement with its suppliers to make 
Dell-specific investments by reducing the number of its suppliers from 204 to just 47 (Rangan & Bell, 1999).   
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Market imperfections in the trading of knowledge (Teece, 1980), information asymmetry (Arrow, 
1974), and time compression diseconomies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) make firm-specific knowledge a non-
tradable asset that must be developed and accumulated within the firm (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Teece, Pisano 
& Shuen, 1997). Therefore, when suppliers need firm-specific knowledge to perform outsourced work they 
typically only have access to this knowledge via prior implementation of related tasks and learning-by-doing 
(Hatch & Mowery, 1998). For example, by working on patents of a client, a patent law firm may develop 
deeper understanding of the company’s technologies, R&D priorities and programs, market strategies, and 
ways of doing business, all of which are useful for future projects that build on this firm-specific knowledge. 
While the activity could have been outsourced to any supplier at the outset, those suppliers that were able to 
develop firm-specific knowledge through prior outsourcing would gain an advantageous position over time 
relative to other suppliers. Put differently, the need for significant firm-specific knowledge in a firm’s set of 
outsourced projects suggests that a fundamental transformation  (Williamson, 1985) from an ex ante 
competitive market to an ex post  bilateral dependence  has taken place. Since only a limited number of 
suppliers could develop such knowledge, and it can be leveraged across multiple firm-specific outsourcing 
projects, much of the firm’s outsourced work may end up being handled by those limited suppliers possessing 
the firm-specific knowledge. 
In addition, high firm-specificity inherently implies that the focal knowledge activity or project has 
strategic value to the firm (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997), and it may also signal the existence of related sets 
of proprietary knowledge assets that need to be disclosed to suppliers. Therefore, firms may face elevated 
appropriability hazards that strategically important knowledge will leak out and get into the hands of 
competitors. A firm exhibiting sufficient foresight will require adequate economic safeguards to mitigate these 
appropriability hazards before entrusting suppliers with strategic knowledge; however, implementing and 
enforcing such economic safeguards (e.g., through relational governance) and developing relational capital 
(Dyer & Singh, 1998) are costly and can only be justified with a small number of suppliers. As with firm-
specific knowledge, relational capital developed with a supplier can also be leveraged across multiple 
transactions within the firm’s outsourcing portfolio. Thus, such suppliers are placed in a superior position to 
undertake outsourced work that is more firm-specific, and are likely to obtain a disproportionate share of this  
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work. While the relevance of appropriability concerns can vary across outsourcing contexts – for example, due 
to variations in the availability and use of contractual provisions, in institutional safeguards, and in the 
strategic importance of the knowledge-based work –  its marginal effect will nonetheless be in the same 
direction. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The greater the need for firm-specific knowledge across the firm’s portfolio of 
outsourced projects the higher the concentration of the firm’s supply portfolio, ceteris paribus. 
Interrelatedness 
Prior research suggests that contemporaneous interdependencies or complementarities between trans-
actions are germane to outsourcing decisions (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). For example, when activities are 
interrelated their vertical integration decisions are correlated (Novak & Stern, 2009) and they are also more 
likely to be concurrently sourced (Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009). Similarly, the modularity literature highlights 
that modular products –  which have limited interdependencies –  are likely to lead to modularity in the 
associated organizational choices (Hoetker, 2006; Sanchez & Mahoney, 1996). In sum, the central insight of 
the extant literature is that when activities are interrelated, firms can benefit from making organizational 
choices that take account of potential complementarities and coordinate them effectively (Milgrom & Roberts, 
1995; Siggelkow, 2002).  
Drawing on  this prior research, we propose that interrelatedness among outsourced projects may 
influence the extent to which they are outsourced to a concentrated set of suppliers as opposed to a more 
distributed supplier set. If the firm’s outsourced projects are interrelated, there may be complementarities that 
need to be coordinated across these projects. For example, in IT projects, it may be necessary to make sure that 
one IT component or system is able to work seamlessly with another. Similarly, in patent prosecution work, it 
may be necessary to modify or tweak the coverage of a given patent based on what is being described and 
claimed in others. Such interactions between outsourced projects will likely be easier to coordinate across a 
single (or fewer) supplier organization(s) than across multiple suppliers. Additionally, interrelated projects 
may also benefit from scope economies stemming from common knowledge or other resource inputs required 
for their execution. It has been long recognized that such scope economies are difficult to leverage across firm 
boundaries, particularly in the presence of market imperfections for trading the underlying knowledge  
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resources between firms (Teece, 1980).  Thus, sets of interrelated projects may experience synergies such that 
joint execution of these projects by the same supplier yields positive spillovers that are more difficult to 
capture across multiple suppliers. 
When viewed at the portfolio level, if there are greater interdependencies across outsourced projects in 
the firm’s portfolio, it is economically valuable to actively coordinate these projects to capture 
complementarities or knowledge-based scope economies. In essence, we extend prior research that emphasizes 
the importance of contemporaneous spillovers between transactions (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999; Novak & 
Stern, 2009) to complementarities across the entire set of transactions in the firm’s portfolio. In sum, when the 
set of projects in the firm’s outsourcing portfolio are highly interrelated, it creates an impetus for greater 
supply portfolio concentration because these interdependencies are more difficult to coordinate across larger 
sets of suppliers. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: The greater the interrelatedness across the firm’s portfolio of outsourced projects the 
higher the concentration of the firm’s supply portfolio, ceteris paribus. 
Reliance on Outsourcing 
The extent to which a firm relies on outsourcing in a particular type of knowledge-based work may 
have a bearing on its SPC.  Outsourcing has several advantages for firms as market forces enhance efficiency 
and access to external capabilities. However, as a firm increases its reliance on outsourcing across its entire 
portfolio of activity, it also increases its dependency on suppliers as a whole, making it more vulnerable to 
expropriation by suppliers (Mayer & Salomon, 2006). Therefore, the firm needs to establish governance 
mechanisms that protect it from potential transactional hazards stemming from higher exposure to outsourcing 
across its portfolio of projects, over and above what may be dictated by the hazards present in any individual 
transaction. Relational governance (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Macneil, 1980) has been suggested as a complement 
to formal explicit contracts to address such coordination challenges (Hoetker, 2005; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
Strategic commitment to repeated exchanges in long-term business relationships with a limited number of 
suppliers forms the basis for relational governance, which implies higher concentration in supplier choice.  
Controlling for the volume of outsourcing, we consider the extent to which the firm uses – and thus 
relies on – outsourcing relative to the total volume of its activity. A greater reliance on outsourcing may itself  
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arise from prior decisions to outsource, which can constrain current sourcing choices through path dependent 
impacts on capabilities developed within the firm (Argyres & Zenger, 2011; Mayer, Somaya & Williamson, 
2011). Regardless of its origins, however, when firms rely heavily on suppliers for a given activity, relational 
governance improves firm-supplier relationships through at least three mechanisms. First, buyers might be 
shielded from economic hold-up hazards, which may be higher when suppliers know that the firm cannot 
easily perform the same activities themselves (Coff, 1999). With relational governance, an expectation of 
benefits from future exchanges can outweigh benefits from self-interested moves at the expense of the buyer, 
so the supplier is less likely to act opportunistically (Klein & Leffler, 1981). In addition to attenuating 
opportunistic behavior, accountability and responsiveness of the supplier to the buyer may be increased 
through relational governance. Further, norms of information exchange and joint problem solving between a 
firm and its supplier(s) lead to the development of relational capital (Dyer & Singh, 1998), which increases the 
likelihood of finding a prompt solution if the supplier faces a problem in delivering the outsourced work. 
Second, vulnerabilities  in exchange  due to deficient measurement and monitoring, which can be 
especially problematic when the output itself is a knowledge-product, can  frequently  be overcome via 
cooperative  norms  (Ouchi, 1979) that emerge in relational governance. The performance of outsourced 
knowledge-based services is often difficult to measure due to challenges in determining quality by observation 
or inspection (Barzel, 1982)
iv, and in ascertaining supplier productivity in team production with the firm 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984). Because task programmability is also likely to be 
low in knowledge-based services (Jones, 1984) – that is, observed supplier inputs and sequences of supplier 
actions are poor measures of quality – both output monitoring and behavioral monitoring become ineffective 
(Mahoney, 1992). Under these  particular  circumstances, cooperative norms  help achieve a self-enforcing 
agreement or private ordering (Srinivasan & Brush, 2006; Telser, 1980) between the firms.  
Third, a history of recurrent transactions with the same supplier under relational contracting decreases 
the supplier’s ability to misrepresent its capabilities. Adverse selection in supplier choice (Akerlof, 1970) may 
be a particularly vexing problem when reliance on outsourcing is high because the firm does not have the 
capacity to internalize an activity quickly once it realizes that its supplier is deficient.  However, after repeated  
 
11 
transactions under relational contracting, the focal firm continues working only with those capable suppliers 
that have revealed their actual type.  
Some benefits from relational governance are realized even if the firm’s reliance on outsourcing is low. 
However, these benefits come at the cost of diminished market forces on suppliers, and the substantial costs 
associated with building and maintaining relational governance with key suppliers. In turn, if there is a high 
reliance on outsourcing across the firm’s portfolio of transactions, the benefits associated with relational 
governance may be sufficiently high so as to justify these costs. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: The greater the firm’s reliance on outsourcing (as a percentage of the focal activity) the 
higher the concentration of the firm’s supply portfolio, ceteris paribus. 
Supplier Capabilities and Domain Diversity 
Although outsourced knowledge-based work in a given area draws on the same broad technical or 
professional knowledge, these projects can be in multiple domains within that area of work, such as technical 
or professional sub-fields, or different application areas. For example, software development for inventory 
management and human resources management represent two different domains in IT services, each with their 
own unique needs and attributes. Adept suppliers of inventory management software may not possess strong 
capabilities for human resources software development, and vice versa. Thus, we propose that domain diversity 
in the firm’s outsourced projects, which in turn requires diversity in its suppliers’ capabilities, is inversely 
related to its supply portfolio concentration. By domain diversity, we mean the extent to which a firm’s 
outsourced projects are distributed across many and relatively unrelated knowledge or capability domains. 
The capabilities approach to organizational boundary choices finds that the relative capabilities of 
buyers and suppliers are key factors in the vertical integration decision of firms (Argyres, 1996; Leiblein & 
Miller, 2003). The firm’s tendency to consider supplier capabilities relevant to its outsourced work has two 
implications for configuring its set of suppliers. First, firms will match outsourced projects in a given domain 
to suppliers based on whether they possess the required capabilities. Second, within this group of potential 
suppliers, a firm is more likely to outsource to the most capable supplier. Thus, when the firm needs to access 
a more diverse set of capabilities, these forces militate against the tendencies toward a more concentrated 
supply portfolio. Absent such imperatives to access diverse supplier capabilities, a firm is likely to outsource  
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multiple projects in its portfolio to the same supplier(s) due to the potential benefits discussed in the preceding 
sections. In other words, while high SPC may be advantageous for relational governance, coordination across 
related transactions and building firm-specific knowledge, it may also entail capability-related deficiencies in 
adapting to diverse task environments. 
There may be practical limits to capability development in multiple diverse domains by a supplier. 
Suppliers develop capabilities in each domain through their prior experience in performing tasks related to that 
domain (Argyres & Zenger, 2011; Leiblein & Miller, 2003; Mayer et al, 2011); therefore, even if some 
capability exists in more than one domain, different emphases in the prior experiences of suppliers may lead to 
differential strengths across capability domains (Nelson, 1991). Furthermore, because supplier output quality 
is often difficult to evaluate in knowledge-based services and specialization is assumed to be a signal of 
competence, supplier firms may remain relatively undiversified to signal their competence via specialization 
(Von Nordenflycht, 2010). Since the assignment of the outsourced projects to suppliers takes into account the 
supplier’s capabilities in that domain, different suppliers are likely to be utilized, especially in unrelated areas. 
Accordingly, as a firm taps into outsourcing across more diverse domains, it may need to apportion its 
portfolio of outsourced work to a larger, more diverse set of suppliers, leading to lower concentration (greater 
fragmentation) in its supply portfolio.  This logic leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The greater the domain diversity across the firm’s portfolio of outsourced projects the 
lower the concentration of the firm’s supply portfolio, ceteris paribus. 
Technological Dynamism 
The pace of technological change in the domains where the firm’s outsourcing takes place is also 
likely to affect the firm’s supply portfolio concentration. If underlying technologies are highly dynamic, 
implying rapid changes in the knowledge needed to execute outsourced projects, there is a higher probability 
that knowledge-based capabilities currently employed for the firm’s outsourced tasks may become obsolete.  
In dynamic contexts, the nature of technological advancements may be unknown ex-ante, which makes it 
difficult for firms and their suppliers to anticipate future capability requirements. Therefore, an important 
consideration for firms configuring their supply portfolios in dynamic technological environments is how to 
gain access to the required capabilities in case their suppliers’ capabilities do not stay relevant.  Because  
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supplier capabilities may become obsolescent, the future value of sunk bilateral investments in firm-specific 
knowledge and relational capital are likely to be lower (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986), thus diminishing 
the need to increase SPC to incentivize these investments. Further, if current suppliers do not adequately 
update their knowledge base, the firm may not be able to switch easily to new suppliers because such a move 
is likely to entail significant costs (and time) in searching and evaluating suppliers, and in developing working 
relationships with them (which may itself require a modicum of relational and firm-specific knowledge 
investments). Consequently, it may be advantageous to retain some degree of strategic flexibility in the supply 
portfolio and to limit the firm’s reliance on particular suppliers.  In other words, one potential impact of 
technological dynamism is to decrease the value of relation-specific investments, and thus to engage in 
outsourcing that is less concentrated. 
The logic provided above posits that the primary impact of technological dynamism is to decrease 
relation-specific investments, rather than to increase the difficulty of contracting (while holding specific 
investments constant) as the traditional transaction cost reasoning holds (Williamson, 1985). The latter effect 
is suggested by potential concerns about so-called behavioral uncertainty (Williamson, 1985), which can 
become problematic as a result of higher incompleteness in contracting and the greater need for bilateral 
adaptation in dynamic technology domains. Research in organizational economics has not settled which of 
these two mechanisms –  driven by technological obsolescence or behavioral uncertainty, respectively – 
dominates when firms operate in fast-moving technological domains (Lajili, Madunic & Mahoney, 2007; 
Mahoney, 1992; Poppo & Zenger, 1998). Indeed, after initially proposing the behavioral uncertainty rationale, 
Williamson (1999) suggested that when technology itself is in flux – such as at the developmental stage of a 
market – the calculus of its impact on governance may change. Moreover, empirical findings about the effects 
of technological uncertainty on outsourcing-related choices have also been very equivocal  (Afuah, 2001; 
Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986; Harrigan, 1986; Hoetker, 2005; Poppo & Zenger, 1998; Walker & Weber, 1984).  
However, in outsourced knowledge-based services, concerns about the obsolescence of supplier 
capabilities are likely to trump issues related to behavioral uncertainty and incomplete contracting. One 
important factor is that outsourcing in this sector takes the form of distinct projects, and there is relatively little 
technological uncertainty when contracting over each of these projects. Thus, contractual incompleteness and  
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associated challenges for adapting to technological change are less of a concern in knowledge-based services. 
Instead, changes in the technological landscape are more relevant to the risk that supplier capabilities may not 
keep up with the advancing technological frontier, thus undermining the value of spillovers between projects in 
the form of relational capital and firm-specific knowledge. Second, while changes in the underlying technology 
tend to impact the production of knowledge-based services directly through the need for new or different 
knowledge, only rarely does it significantly impact the scope of work contracted for or the coordination of this 
work with other projects. With patent prosecution work, for example, suppliers are required simply to process 
the patent through a series of legal stages in exchange of payment that is either fixed or billed by the hour, and 
technological change does little to change this contractual equation. A useful contrast may be drawn with 
outsourcing for components, where technological change may necessitate both the delivery of a different work 
product and greater coordination with the buyer’s overall product design (Hoetker, 2005).  
In sum, we conclude that the predominant concerns about obsolescence of supplier capabilities would 
make firms in knowledge-based services less likely to opt for relational contracting when technological 
dynamism is high (Balakrishnan & Wernerfelt, 1986). Since contracting is typically at the project level, distributing 
outsourced projects among more suppliers enables the firm to draw on those suppliers whose capabilities 
remain relevant as the technology regime evolves, without the need to specify all contingencies of technological 
change and capability development in the initial contracts. Because firms may additionally wish to avoid the 
disruption and cost of finding new suppliers at short notice, we expect overall that technological dynamism 
will lead to lower SPC in knowledge-based services. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 5: The greater the technological dynamism across domain(s) of the firm’s portfolio of 
outsourced projects the lower the concentration of the firm’s supply portfolio, ceteris paribus. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
Sample 
We test our hypotheses by examining the set of suppliers used for outsourcing patent prosecution work 
in a sample of technology-based Fortune 500 firms over the period 1990-1995. Our focal sample of companies 
consists of 129 public U.S. firms in the 1989 Fortune 500 survey (published in 1990) from technology-based 
industries (i.e., chemicals, computer manufacturing, electronics, and pharmaceutical, scientific & photographic 
equipment). Using the Directory of Corporate Affiliations, we identified the entire corporate family 
(subsidiaries and divisions) of each sample firm in each year. By matching corporate business units with their 
unique patent assignee codes at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), we obtained all patents filed 
by our sample firms during the period 1990-1995.  In essence, we replicate the NBER patent dataset (Hall, 
Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2001) albeit at a more detailed year-by-year level for a smaller sample of large firms. 
Based on this approach, we identified a total of 80,893 patents filed by these firms over six years (1990-95), 
which we aggregated to the firm-year level of analysis. These patent-based data were augmented with yearly 
firm financial data from Research Insight. 
Our goal is to analyze the set of law firms (suppliers) used by our sample companies for outsourced 
patent prosecution work, which consists of drafting patent applications, filing them at the USPTO, and under-
taking subsequent legal and administrative steps till the patent is granted. Patent prosecution work is typically 
done by patent attorneys, who are trained in both law and technology, and must be admitted to the patent bar to 
practice before the patent office. Thus, patent work is typical of knowledge-based services, employing talented 
professionals located either within or outside the (client) firm. To be clear, we do not examine patent litigation 
work, which occurs later in the life of the patent and is largely outsourced to law firms.  
Patent data have a number of strengths for studying outsourcing in knowledge-based services. First, 
each patent is a narrowly-defined work project, and unlike other knowledge-based services, patent prosecution 
projects are by-and-large similar in the nature of work involved (which is to draft, file and obtain a patent). 
Second, large companies typically file for many patents in each year, making it feasible to control for firm 
effects and conduct longitudinal analysis of the data. Third, because patents contain rich data about the 
technological characteristics of the invention, it is possible to measure a number of focal and control variables  
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related to patent legal projects. For all these reasons, data on patent (legal) outsourcing enable us to conduct 
well-controlled and robust tests of our theoretical propositions.  
Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variable measures the extent to which the outsourced patent prosecution work of a 
focal client company is concentrated within a few suppliers (law firms), as opposed to being distributed among 
a large number of suppliers. We measure this variable, Supply Portfolio Concentration, using a Herfindahl-
type index (HHI) of outsourced patents computed across different suppliers. We coded the supplier responsible 
for the patent prosecution work of each outsourced patent from the “Attorney or Agent” field on the patent, 
which lists up to three attorney and/or law firm names provided by the patentee when submitting the patent 
issuance fee to the USPTO. Where law firm names were absent, we cross-referenced the listed attorney names 
with the USPTO’s yearly rosters of registered patent attorneys to identify the law firms that employed them.  
In an online appendix we explain these details and other checks and data updates we performed using the 
Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) database of the USPTO.  These analyses provide significant 
confidence in the accuracy of patent outsourcing data and our measures. After accounting for spelling 
differences and name changes, we identified a total of 534 unique law firms to which patents were outsourced 
in our sample.  
We aggregated the number of patents outsourced by year from each firm to each supplier, and 
employed these firm-supplier frequency counts to compute a non-biased measure of SPC. HHI measures based 
on percentages (shares) computed from count data can be biased, and the bias increases when the total number 
of counts is small (Hall, 2002).  If Nijt denotes the number of patents outsourced by the ith firm to supplier j in 
year t, and Nit is the total number of patents outsourced by firm i in year t, the unbiased measure of SPC is as 
follows (Hall, 2002): 
            where    is the (biased) HHI based on count shares 
This variable has a range between 0 and 1, where a larger number implies higher supply portfolio 
concentration. Note that the unbiased estimate of HHI is undefined if Nit=1.  Moreover, the bias correction  
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generates extreme values when Nit is small which leads to high variance (noise) in our dependent variable. 
Thus, we restrict the dataset to observations where at least three patents are outsourced (our results are robust 
to using four or five patents as the cutoff, as well as not applying the HHI bias correction). 
Independent Variables 
We measure our first independent variable Firm-specific Knowledge  as the percentage of patent 
citations to the firm’s own prior patents (self-citations) averaged over all the firm’s outsourced patents in each 
year.  A higher percentage of backward self-citations implies that the firm’s outsourced patents build to a 
greater extent on its own inventions than on technologies invented more broadly in the economy. Because 
patent legal work requires detailed knowledge about the technological background of the patent, this variable 
directly measures the firm-specificity of knowledge work outsourced by the firm.  In using this measure, we 
implicitly build on prior work that explores the meaning of self-citations (Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2001; 
Somaya, 2003) and on research that has employed self-citations specifically to measure firm-specific 
knowledge (Wang & Chen, 2010; Wang, He & Mahoney, 2009). We expect the coefficient of Firm-specific 
Knowledge to be positive. 
The variable Interrelatedness is measured by the extent to which a firm’s outsourced patents are in 
connected (versus disconnected) subsets. Any two patents that share common backward citations are assumed 
to be connected to each other. If the firm’s outsourced patents and the connections between them are 
represented by a graph, then each connected subset (that is also disconnected from others) is called a 
component of the graph. We use UCINET (Borgatti, Everett & Freeman, 2002) to identify such components 
within each firm-year set of outsourced patents and measure interrelatedness by computing a (non-biased) HHI 
of the distribution of patent shares into such subsets.  For example, if all the firm’s outsourced patents are 
connected to each other, they form one giant component and their interrelatedness (HHI) is 1.0.  However, 
with two equal sized components, the interrelatedness evaluates to 0.25. We also used two other measures for 
Interrelatedness: density of the patent graph (defined as the ratio of connections in the graph to the maximum 
number of connections possible if all nodes were connected) and weighted density of the patent graph (where 
the weights are the fraction of joint citations shared by any two patents), and found similar results. We expect 
the coefficient of Interrelatedness to be positive.   
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We measure the firm’s Reliance on Outsourcing by the percentage of patents that are outsourced each 
year by the firm; i.e., the number of patents outsourced divided by the total number of patents applied for. We 
note below that the total volume of outsourcing is employed separately as a control variable. We expect the 
coefficient of Reliance on Outsourcing to be positive. 
The independent variable, Domain Diversity, is measured using the technology classes of firms’ out-
sourced patents. Knowledge about the technological area of  the patent is an important prerequisite for 
performing patent prosecution work. Patent attorneys review prior art relevant to the patent, ensure that the 
patent describes the invention adequately, and draft patent claims to delimit the novel technological space that 
the firm seeks to “own,” all of which require a detailed understanding of the technology domain of the 
invention. Patent documents report the technological domain of each patent by international patent classes 
(IPC) or U.S. patent classes (USPC). We use the IPC system because it is better structured than the USPC (in 
particular, it is hierarchically nested) and organized with a single unifying logic (by technology area, rather 
than an ad hoc combination of technology and industry) (Lerner, 1995). We measure Domain Diversity by 
computing a (non-biased) HHI of the shares of a firm’s outsourced patents across different 4-digit IPCs in a 
given year, and then subtracting it from 1. Like any taxonomy, the IPC draws sharp boundaries between 
technology areas even when they are in fact related. Therefore, an unadjusted HHI will not account for the 
relatedness among IPCs, and treat all IPCs as being perfectly unrelated (or orthogonal). To correct this 
potential bias, we need a valid measure of relatedness between IPCs, and a method for adjusting the HHI. Our 
logic about domain diversity is ultimately about the availability of supplier capabilities across a diverse set of 
domains; therefore, we measure relatedness by the extent to which suppliers’ volumes of patent prosecution 
work in any two IPCs are correlated (based on 163,524 patents handled by the 100 largest supplier law firms). 
Accordingly, we employ the following Domain Diversity measure:
v 
Domain Diversity (adjusted HHI) =1 –   
where pj and pk are the firm’s shares of outsourced patents in IPC j and k respectively, and Sj and Sk  are 
vectors of the shares of patents prosecuted by the 100 largest law firms in those IPCs.  If all IPCs are 
unrelated, the correlations evaluate to zero and only the squared shares of the firm’s patenting in IPCs factor  
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into the computation, like a conventional HHI measure.  Finally, we apply the HHI bias correction factor 
(Hall, 2002). We expect the coefficient of Domain Diversity to be negative.  
We measure Technological Dynamism using the weighted average of the growth rate of patenting 
across the technological domains (IPCs) associated with firm’s outsourced projects.  Specifically, we used the 
universe of patents issued by USPTO from 1986-1995 to compute the growth rate in each 4-digit IPC based on 
a 3-year moving average of the number of patents in that IPC.  The growth rate of patents in an IPC measures 
the pace of innovation, which adds rapidly to the prior art and thus increases dynamism in the knowledge 
needed to carry out patent prosecution work within that technological domain. Since even a unit change in the 
number of patents leads to noisy fluctuations in the growth rate for IPCs with small numbers of patents, we 
only included the growth rates of IPCs with at least 10 issued patents during our 10-year observation window. 
The excluded IPCs are associated with only 1.75% of patents in our sample. We then computed the weighted 
average growth rate for each firm-year by weighting these growth rates with the share of firm’s outsourced 
patents in each IPC in that year. We expect the coefficient of Technological Dynamism to be negative. 
Controls 
In order to rule out potential alternative explanations for our empirical results, we control for a number 
of additional variables.   
Outsourcing Volume. A baseline effect of decreased SPC is expected from higher outsourcing volume 
(measured by the logged number of patents outsourced). The lower the volume of outsourcing, the more 
constrained firms may find themselves in identifying and coordinating with additional suppliers.  
Cites per Patent.  We control for the average number of citations the firm’s outsourced patents 
received in future years, which accounts for the potential value or importance of the firm’s outsourced patents 
(Jaffe, Fogarty & Banks, 1998). This variable is adjusted for potential bias introduced by truncation of the 
series of forward citations (Hall, Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2001).  
R&D Expenditure. We control for the log of firms’ R&D expenditures. R&D expenditures may 
represent the importance of innovation and in turn patenting for the firm. 
Firm Size. We control for firm size with the log of firm’s sales in each year.  
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Litigation Risk.  To account for heterogeneities relating to potential patent litigation and address 
concerns about the impact of conflicts of interest, we controlled for the percentage of a firm’s outsourced 
patents that cite any other previously litigated patent.  Patent litigation data were collected from the LitAlert 
database of the USPTO (for District Court litigation), and combined with patent cases from the Section 337 
forum of the U.S. International Trade Commission.  Patents citing previously litigated patents are themselves 
around six times as likely to be litigated as the average patent (Mayer et al., 2011); accordingly, they can be 
viewed as a proxy for the litigation risk of a firm’s patents. 
Legal Market Size. The size of the firm’s local market for patent legal services may influence its 
ability to farm out work to multiple suppliers. Legal Market Size is measured as the weighted average number 
of patent attorneys (in 100s) across metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) in a given year, where the weights 
are the fraction of the firm’s internal attorneys (who are critical boundary-spanners that interact with external 
attorneys) in each MSA. If the focal firm had no internal attorneys in a given year, we used its headquarters 
location (with weight = 1).     
Technology Areas. The firms in our sample straddle a variety of industries, and we seek to control for 
the primary technology areas, and changes in technology areas, in which they are active.  Thus, we employ a 
set of widely used technology groupings based on U.S. Patent Classes (USPC) (Jaffe, 1998), and control for 
the fraction of the firm’s patents that fall into each of these technology areas – namely, Chemical, Drugs and 
Medical, Electronics Computer Optical and Nuclear, and Mechanical (“Other” is the reference category). 
Year Dummies We include a dummy variable for each (filing) year (1995 is the reference year). 
Econometric Models 
In our econometric models, we seek to explain Supply Portfolio Concentration in the firm’s set of 
outsourced projects, conditional on the extent of outsourcing by the firm.  The data consist of firm-year 
longitudinal panels, and we use panel data econometric techniques. Since 9% of observations consist of 
outsourcing to a single supplier, our dependent variable SPC  is truncated at 1 for these observations. 
Therefore, we apply econometric models appropriate for a truncated dependent variable, i.e., Tobit models 
(Tobin, 1958). Since conditional fixed-effects Tobit estimates are inconsistent (Greene, 2004), our primary 
econometric model is the random-effects Tobit (Matyas & Sevestre, 2008). To evaluate robustness, we  
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estimated random- and fixed-effects OLS models and these estimates are discussed following our main results. 
We also conducted a Hausman’s (1978) specification test and found that we could not reject the null 
hypothesis that the random-effects estimates are consistent, which supports the use of random-effects models 
for our main results. 
RESULTS 
 We examine the drivers of SPC in outsourced legal patent work, and larger values of our dependent 
variable imply higher SPC. Tables 1 and 2 present the descriptive statistics of our data and the correlation 
table, respectively. Table 3 reports results from our main random-effects Tobit models, wherein Model 1 only 
includes control variables. In models 2, 3 and 4, the coefficients of firm-specific knowledge, interrelatedness 
and reliance on outsourcing, each introduced separately, are positive as hypothesized and significant at the 1% 
level.  In models 5 and 6, the coefficients of domain diversity and technological dynamism are negative as 
hypothesized and significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively.  Model 7 includes all variables, and the 
estimated coefficients retain the same sign and significance levels as the earlier models except for firm-
specific knowledge, which is significant at the 5% level in model 7. Overall, Table 3 provides strong 
corroboration for all five of our hypotheses. 
 [Insert Tables 1, 2 and 3 about here] 
To evaluate the robustness of our empirical results, we conducted a number of supplementary analyses 
with alternative model specifications. As noted earlier, our results were unaffected when we dropped the bias 
correction for HHI-based variables, used alternative cutoffs to exclude observations with missing data about 
supplier identity, employed alternative measures for Interrelatedness, and when we dropped the relatedness 
adjustment for Domain Diversity. In supplementary analyses, we also compared our random-effects Tobit 
findings with random-effects and fixed-effects OLS models. Random-effects OLS estimates approximate our 
Tobit results quite well, albeit with somewhat smaller but statistically significant coefficient sizes. In fixed-
effects models, the significance levels of some (potentially inconsistent) coefficients are lower, but the same 




Having discussed the statistical significance and robustness of our findings, we turn our attention to 
the magnitudes (or economic impacts) of the estimated coefficients (Ziliak & McCloskey, 2004). We examine 
these impacts relative to one standard deviation (S.D.) of each independent variable. A one-S.D. increase in 
firm-specific knowledge (0.079 units) is associated with an increase in supply portfolio concentration of 0.03 
units. Similarly, a one-S.D. increase in interrelatedness (0.087 units) and reliance on outsourcing (0.377 units) 
correspond to increases in SPC of 0.04 units and 0.102 units, respectively.  Finally, one-S.D. increase in 
domain diversity (0.198 units) and technological dynamism (0.054 units) would lead to 0.063 unit and 0.036 
unit decreases in SPC. Cumulatively, the combined impact of a one-standard deviation change in these five 
variables is approximately equal to the firm going from 16 suppliers to just 3, each receiving an equal share of 
the firm’s outsourcing. Based on these analyses, we conclude that the impacts on supply portfolio 
concentration resulting from changes in our explanatory variables are quite large and economically impactful.  
Limitations and Additional Analyses 
While our empirical findings have important implications for theory and practice, this study is not 
without limitations. First, our empirical evidence is limited to a sample of outsourced patent prosecution 
services in a particular time period and may not hold in other settings and time periods. For example, we focus 
on outsourcing by large Fortune 500 firms; however, small and large firms may differ in their organizational 
structures, internal resource constraints, and governance capabilities (Mayer & Salomon, 2006), which can 
translate into different strategies for managing suppliers. Furthermore, the strategic flexibility to outsource 
work to multiple suppliers might not be available outside of knowledge-based services; for example, 
manufacturing settings are characterized by increasing returns to scale or suppliers with strong market power, 
which may become the dominant considerations in these settings. Moreover, while patent legal work is an 
important support activity and a valuable complementary capability for technology firms, it is generally not 
considered a primary source of competitive advantage.  Empirical findings from this context may therefore not 
hold in other more “mission-critical” knowledge-based services. Additionally, patent prosecution work is 
typically conducted by single attorneys or small teams of attorneys, and our findings may not generalize to 
larger, more complex, knowledge-based services.  Future research can build on this study by explaining the 
drivers of supply portfolio concentration in alternative settings.   
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Another characteristic of patent legal work is that appropriability hazards may be relatively low 
because the suppliers (law firms) are bound by the attorney-client privilege, and are also unlikely to become 
competitors.  In other contexts, the leakage of proprietary knowledge to suppliers who constitute more 
significant appropriability risks may have a bigger impact on how the firm apportions its outsourcing among 
suppliers. In developing our hypotheses we listed multiple mechanisms through which certain factors – such as 
firm-specific knowledge – can affect supply portfolio concentration. While these multiple mechanisms all 
impact SPC in the same direction, we cannot empirically discriminate between them.  As the example of 
appropriability hazards illustrates, these mechanisms may play different roles, and matter to different extents 
across industry settings. Therefore, future research can shed further light on the differences between these 
mechanisms, and on their relevance to different knowledge-based services. 
Law firms are constrained by ethical rules and guidelines in accepting business from multiple clients 
when there are clear conflicts of interest (Oddi, 2004). Other knowledge-based services may also be similarly 
constrained, but their conflicts of interest are arguably less regulated than in legal services. However, conflicts 
of interest in patent prosecution work appear to be quite narrow in scope and may be even less important for 
an aggregate phenomenon such as SPC (especially with a longitudinal empirical design).
vi While it is difficult 
to identify conflicts of interest directly in our data, these conflicts are expected to be substantially higher in the 
context of patent litigation (Oddi, 2004). Thus, our control variable “litigation risk” is a proxy for potential 
conflicts of interest. Additionally, client firms may use conflicts of interest strategically by working with 
multiple legal suppliers to constrain the supplier options available to competitors in litigation. In particular, 
this strategy may be attractive in technologically dynamic areas and thus provide an alternative explanation for 
Hypothesis 5. Interestingly, we find that neither litigation risk nor its interaction with technological dynamism 
has a statistically significant impact on SPC.  One plausible explanation for the apparently limited impact of 
conflicts of interest may be the relatively large numbers of suppliers available for patent legal services – our 
data show over 1,400 U.S. patent law firms in the early 1990s. Thus, even if a few suppliers are conflicted, 
client firms may not be especially constrained in adjusting their supply portfolio concentration. Conflicts of 
interest are nonetheless a consideration in interpreting our findings and generalizing them to other settings.  
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One potential concern with our results is that the firm’s reliance on outsourcing may be endogenous to 
our dependent variable. We evaluated these endogeneity concerns in two ways.  First, we applied the 
techniques of Granger (1969) causality to evaluate if lagged values of SPC contain useful information in 
predicting Reliance on Outsourcing, in addition to the lagged values of the latter variable. Using 1-year lags, 
we find no empirical evidence that lagged SPC predicts (i.e., Granger-causes)  Reliance on Outsourcing. 
Second, we evaluate evidence for endogeneity by conducting a Hausman (1978) test for endogeneity, which 
compares estimates from our random-effects OLS model with two-stage instrumental variables estimates for 
random-effects OLS. We use the average number of inventors per patent as an instrument for reliance on 
outsourcing. Again, we could not reject the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of the two models 
are statistically identical. Therefore, it appears unlikely that the firm’s reliance on outsourcing is endogenous 
to its supply portfolio concentration. Nonetheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that “unobservables” may 
simultaneously influence both reliance on outsourcing and SPC. Choices regarding how much a firm relies on 
outsourcing may stem from various environmental (e.g., industry or market forces), historical (e.g., prior 
capability development), or exchange attributes (e.g., expected firm specificity of projects), which may also in 
turn influence supply portfolio concentration.    
A further potential limitation of this study is that in developing a general theory of how domain 
diversity may affect a firm’s supply choices, we have not considered how the capabilities of existing suppliers 
may condition this relationship. In particular, if the firm has an existing base of more specialized suppliers, it 
may experience a greater need to fragment its outsourcing among suppliers with higher domain diversity.  In 
supplementary analyses, we examined this proposition with a variable “Existing supply base” measured as the 
weighted average specialization of the firm’s existing suppliers (using an HHI measure similar to domain 
diversity). The empirical results continue to show statistically significant support for the negative impact of 
domain diversity on SPC, but also show that specialization of the firm’s existing supply base exacerbates this 
effect.  In other words, firms with a more specialized supply base make larger changes in their supply portfolio 
concentration (relative to firms with less specialized suppliers) in response to increasing or decreasing levels 
of domain diversity in their outsourced activities. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This paper explains factors that impact concentration in a firm’s supply portfolio, i.e., how outsourced 
knowledge-based service work, as a portfolio, is distributed among different suppliers. Our empirical analyses, 
which take advantage of rich data available in the context of outsourced patent prosecution work, show that 
firm-specific knowledge, interrelatedness of outsourced projects, reliance on outsourcing, domain diversity of 
outsourced work, and technological dynamism in the outsourcing domains are related to SPC in both statistical 
significance and economic impact. Subject to the empirical limitations noted above, the current study extends 
research on outsourcing in several important ways. First, we take a substantial step beyond a single transaction 
as the unit of analysis, which has been the mainstay of research on firm boundaries. While prior work has 
pointed to the presence of governance inseparability (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999) and knowledge and 
reputation spillovers between transactions (Mayer, 2006), their implications have largely been studied at the 
transaction level. Examining outsourcing at the portfolio level builds on this research stream, but simultaneously 
sheds light on an aggregate phenomenon that is related to, but distinct from, transaction-level phenomena.   
Specifically, the current paper draws attention to supplier management by firms at the portfolio level. 
While prior research has addressed several aspects of supplier management, these analyses – consistent with 
the literature on outsourcing –  have  largely been at the level of individual outsourcing transactions or 
individual suppliers. Examining supplier concentration at the portfolio level explains how firms configure 
supply relationships at that level, which has valuable research and managerial implications (as suggested by 
the Cisco and Dell examples noted earlier in this paper), and is thus an important phenomenon that deserves 
further research attention. Additionally, we have described mechanisms at the portfolio level – in particular 
relational governance and firm-specific knowledge embedded in a supplier relationship and the need for real-
time coordination between transactions – that may lead firms to use more concentrated supplier portfolios. The 
imperative to adapt the firm’s outsourcing portfolio either contemporaneously to diverse knowledge demands 
or dynamically to evolving ones acts as a countervailing force on these above-mentioned drivers of greater 
coordination with suppliers (and higher SPC). While we highlight mechanisms that shed light on the simultaneous 
governance of a bundle or portfolio of transactions, we draw on well-developed organizational economics theories 
that have previously examined these mechanisms as they apply to individual transactions.   
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In turn, by highlighting these portfolio-level considerations, we draw attention to their potential impact 
on transaction level choices as well. For example, if a firm is more reliant on outsourcing at the portfolio level 
it may employ a higher SPC and use more relational arrangements with suppliers, which imply a higher level 
of  relational governance  for each outsourced transaction  than would be suggested by the  transaction’s 
attributes alone. Thus, governance decisions for individual transactions will likely be influenced by portfolio 
attributes, over and above transaction-level exchange characteristics. While prior studies have shown that the 
choice of supplier for a focal transaction is affected by other interrelated transactions, which are assumed to be 
exogenous for analytical convenience (Novak & Stern, 2009; Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009), our research 
suggests that governance choices are likely to be made jointly for entire sets of transactions. Future work on 
outsourcing strategies at the transaction level can extend these insights by incorporating portfolio-level 
considerations in a more systematic manner. Additionally, in studying SPC, we have developed theoretically 
relevant variables at the portfolio level of analysis that are potentially valuable for future research on portfolio-
level phenomena in outsourcing. Some of these variables – such as firm-specific knowledge and technological 
dynamism  in  our  study  –  are simple  portfolio-level  averages  of  factors known to impact transaction-level 
outcomes; but others – such as interrelatedness, reliance on outsourcing, and domain diversity – are aggregations 
or compositions of transaction-level features that are uniquely relevant to portfolio-level analyses.  
Concerning the extant literature on supplier management, our research contributes a number of novel 
insights on how firms configure their portfolio of suppliers in knowledge-based services. One finding is that 
the need for firm-specific knowledge in executing outsourced activities leads to greater supply concentration in 
the firm’s outsourcing portfolio. Our research highlights the potential reusability of firm-specific knowledge 
investments,  and  of  relational governance that safeguards the  exchange of sensitive knowledge,  across 
multiple outsourced transactions. Therefore, the average level of firm-specific knowledge across the firm’s 
outsourcing portfolio impacts supplier and governance choices over and above the characteristics of individual 
transactions. This insight is valuable both for suppliers seeking to build closer relationships with client firms, 
and for buyers seeking to manage their exposure to suppliers.  
Recent literature on outsourcing has begun to explore the importance of interrelatedness between 
activities in the form of complementarities and scope economies that need to be actively leveraged along with  
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firm boundary and supplier management choices. Thus far, research has primarily focused on the implications 
of such interdependencies on supplier choice (Hoetker, 2006; Novak & Stern, 2009) and concurrent sourcing 
(Parmigiani & Mitchell, 2009). To these contributions,  we add the insight that interrelatedness between 
outsourced activities also affects the composition of suppliers the firm uses at the portfolio level.  A potentially 
valuable direction for future research is to examine interrelatedness across all firm projects – internalized and 
outsourced – thus deepening our understanding of concurrent sourcing in knowledge-based services. 
A key finding of our study is that reliance on outsourcing increases the concentration of a firm’s 
supply portfolio, an indication of increased strategic commitment to a smaller number of external suppliers. 
Outsourcing has been characterized with an element of strategic flexibility in the literature; rather than make 
commitments to internal capability development, firms outsource to tap into market forces and increase 
strategic flexibility (Quinn, 2000). However, our research shows that a greater reliance on outsourcing may 
also render it more relational, and thus takes away some of the flexibility and presumed choice that reliance on 
the market assumes. These empirical findings also add to prior research on the role of concurrent sourcing (or 
tapered integration), which primarily emphasizes capability (Rothaermel, Hitt & Jobe, 2006) and contract 
monitoring benefits (Parmigiani  & Mitchell, 2009) of simultaneously making and  buying. Our  empirical 
findings suggest an additional potential benefit; namely, firms that are less reliant on outsourcing –  and 
employ concurrent sourcing –  are able to use a less concentrated supply portfolio and thus draw more 
effectively on market forces for cost efficiency, flexibility, and access to capabilities.  
Our empirical findings on domain diversity of the firm’s outsourcing projects point to the enduring 
importance of supplier capabilities in the outsourcing decisions of firms (Argyres, 1996; Leiblein & Miller, 
2003). A firm seeking to consolidate its supply portfolio and reap the associated benefits must consider if a 
more concentrated supply portfolio will provide it with the range of capabilities it needs. Our empirical results 
indicate that as the capability needs of a firm become more heterogeneous, it will likely need to diversify its 
supplier base. Therefore, even firms that appear to be relationally embedded with their current suppliers may 
take on new suppliers when they need to access different capabilities. In turn, diversification of capabilities may 
be a key supplier strategy for retaining clients and leveraging relational capital with them.   
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Additionally, we find that supply portfolios are likely to be less concentrated in technologically 
dynamic environments, where the risk of technological obsolescence and outdated supplier capabilities is high. 
Prior findings on the impact of technological dynamism (or uncertainty) on firm boundary decisions have been 
equivocal or mixed. Contrary to traditional predictions concerning technological uncertainty in transaction cost 
economics (Williamson, 1985), Balakrishnan and Wernerfelt (1986) first modeled and found a pro-outsourcing 
effect of technological obsolescence. By contrast, other research studies have found no empirical evidence in 
either direction for tests of technological uncertainty on firm boundary decisions (Poppo & Zenger, 1998; 
Walker & Weber, 1984). While we highlight the potential bi-directional effects of technological dynamism, 
we draw on characteristics of outsourcing in knowledge-based services to suggest that the net impact may be 
in the direction of greater flexibility (and  lower supply portfolio concentration)  in this context. We find 
empirical  support for this proposition.  Thus, our theoretical logic and empirical findings regarding 
technological dynamism make some additional inroads into an enduring and important puzzle in the broader 
research literature on firm boundaries. However, more research is needed to delineate other conditions under 
which technological dynamism affects firm boundaries and outsourcing in this way.  
Overall, this research indicates that freeing transaction cost theory from one of its foundational tenets 
– that the transaction is the unit of analysis (Williamson, 1985) – may have significant benefits for a vibrant 
organizational economics research program (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1999), which will also provide additional 
strategic insights into how firms leverage internal and external capabilities for competitive advantage (Teece, 
Pisano & Shuen, 1996). The current paper takes a first step by offering the firm’s supply portfolio as the unit 
of analysis, and we anticipate that the next generation of research in this area will study and explain additional 
portfolio-level phenomena, apart from supply concentration. In conclusion, this paper provides early evidence 
that managers and scholars focusing on organizational boundary choices would do well to take into account 
the ecosystem of relationships between firms and their suppliers beyond the transactional level. These higher-
level strategic considerations will likely lead to a richer explanation of organizational boundaries, dynamic 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
 






           
Supply Portfolio 
Concentration 
Non-biased HHI based on shares of outsourced 
patents among suppliers 
0.409  0.285  0.265  0.159 
Firm-specific Knowledge  % backward cites in the firm’s outsourced 
patents that are to its own prior patents 
0.097  0.079  0.074  0.049 
Interrelatedness  Non-biased HHI based on shares of outsourced 
patents into connected subset of shared 
backward citations graph 
0.066  0.087  0.071  0.066 
Reliance on Outsourcing  % outsourcing  0.555  0.377  0.375  0.094 
Domain Diversity  Non-biased HHI based on shares of outsourced 
patents in each technology domain adjusted for 
the relatedness between IPCs based on supplier 
capabilities, subtracted from one 
0.715  0.198  0.181  0.101 
Technological Dynamism  Weighted average of growth rate of the 
technology domains of outsourced patents 
weighted with the share of firm’s outsourced 
patents in each IPC 
0.058  0.054  0.039  0.039 
Outsourcing Volume  (Log) No. outsourced patents  3.058  1.076  0.972  0.464 
Cites per Patent  Average No.  forward cites to an outsourced 
patent 
10.828  7.299  5.855  4.185 
R&D Expenditure  (Log) Firm’s R&D expenditure  5.090  1.451  1.543  0.222 
Firm Size  (Log) Firm’s sales  8.224  1.063  1.033  0.181 
Litigation Risk  % firm’s outsourced patents that cite any other 
previously litigated patent 
0.149  0.093  0.102  0.000 
Legal Market Size  Number of patent attorneys (in 100s) in a MSA 
weighted by the fraction of the firm’s internal 
attorneys in the same MSA 
8.111  7.159  7.451  1.266 
Drugs & Medicals  Technology group dummy variable  0.139  0.272  0.252  0.094 
Chemicals  Technology group dummy variable  0.199  0.259  0.252  0.094 
Electronics, Computers, 
Optical & Nuclear 
Technology group dummy variable  0.473  0.396  0.387  0.094 
Mechanicals  Technology group dummy variable  0.16  0.195  0.198  0.090  
 
34 
Table 2: Correlations between Variables  
Variables  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20 
1  Firm-specific Knowledge  1                                       
2  Interrelatedness  0.22  1                                     
3  Reliance on Outsourcing  -0.33  0.03  1                                   
4  Domain Diversity  0.08  -0.16  -0.22  1                                 
5  Technological Dynamism  -0.03  0.11  -0.04  -0.33  1                               
6  Outsourcing Volume  0.1  0.05  0.22  -0.14  0.24  1                             
7  Cites per Patent  -0.09  0.14  0.07  -0.31  0.27  0.23  1                           
8  R&D Expenditure  0.22  -0.02  -0.52  -0.13  0.32  0.46  0.27  1                         
9  Firm Size  0.27  -0.04  -0.54  0.09  0.13  0.42  0.03  0.83  1                       
10  Litigation Risk  -0.1  0.23  0.08  -0.09  0.07  0.09  0.42  -0.03  0.09  1                     
11  Legal Market Size  -0.05  0.03  -0.05  -0.07  -0.01  -0.05  -0.11  -0.04  -0.06  0.16  1                   
12  Drugs & Medicals  0.04  0.11  -0.35  0.03  0.06  -0.17  0.14  0.25  0.15  0.41  0.39  1                 
13  Chemicals  0.15  0.06  -0.08  0.19  -0.16  -0.22  -0.39  -0.26  -0.08  -0.28  0.07  -0.01  1               
14  Electronics, Computers, 
Optical & Nuclear 
-0.16  -0.06  0.26  -0.35  0.23  0.35  0.35  0.16  -0.05  -0.02  -0.22  -0.55  -0.63  1             
15  Mechanicals  0.09  -0.08  0.07  0.31  -0.29  -0.11  -0.32  -0.25  0  -0.18  -0.15  -0.24  -0.02  -0.35  1           
16  year= 1990  -0.01  -0.01  0.02  0.04  -0.13  -0.08  0.18  -0.04  -0.02  0.02  -0.12  -0.03  0  0.01  0.01  1         
17  year= 1991  -0.04  -0.09  0.03  0.06  0.22  -0.02  0.07  0.01  -0.02  0.01  -0.08  -0.05  0  0.01  0.06  -0.19  1       
18  year= 1992  0  -0.11  -0.04  -0.05  -0.28  -0.04  0.12  -0.03  -0.04  -0.01  0  0  0.02  -0.01  -0.01  -0.21  -0.19  1     
19  year= 1993  -0.06  -0.05  0  0.04  0.12  -0.04  -0.06  -0.03  -0.02  -0.01  0.02  0  0  -0.01  -0.03  -0.2  -0.19  -0.21  1   
20  Year= 1995  0  -0.01  0  -0.04  0.04  0.06  -0.05  0.03  0.05  0.03  0.07  0.05  -0.02  0  -0.03  -0.2  -0.19  -0.2  -0.2  1 35 
Table 3: Determinants of Supply Portfolio Concentration in Outsourcing Patent Legal Work 
(Random-Effects Tobit Models) 
 
               
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
               
Firm-specific Knowledge    0.519
***          0.381
** 
    (0.192)          (0.189) 
               
Interrelatedness      0.572
***        0.471
*** 
      (0.164)        (0.167) 
               
Reliance on Outsourcing        0.285
***      0.272
*** 
        (0.090)      (0.085) 
               
Domain Diversity          -0.364
***    -0.318
*** 
          (0.094)    (0.091) 
               
Technological Dynamism            -0.563
**  -0.673
** 
            (0.286)  (0.278) 
               
Volume of Outsourcing  -0.035
*  -0.032  -0.043
**  -0.082
***  -0.036  -0.032  -0.082
*** 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.026)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.024) 
               
Cites per Patent  0.004  0.004  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.004  0.002 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
               
R&D Expenditure  -0.004  -0.003  0.005  0.025  -0.014  -0.002  0.027 
  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.034)  (0.032) 
               
Firm Size  -0.065  -0.075
*  -0.065  -0.028  -0.043  -0.065  -0.018 
  (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.044)  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.045)  (0.042) 
               
Litigation Risk  0.089  0.120  0.005  -0.007  0.119  0.083  -0.032 
  (0.312)  (0.309)  (0.304)  (0.307)  (0.288)  (0.316)  (0.282) 
               
Legal Market Size  -0.002  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002  0.000 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
               
Drugs & Medicals  -0.361  -0.438
*  -0.411
*  -0.327  -0.513
**  -0.336  -0.527
** 
  (0.241)  (0.240)  (0.237)  (0.238)  (0.238)  (0.240)  (0.231) 
               
Chemicals  0.004  -0.050  -0.050  0.018  -0.099  0.023  -0.129 
  (0.226)  (0.225)  (0.223)  (0.223)  (0.223)  (0.225)  (0.215) 
               
Electronics, Computers,   -0.052  -0.099  -0.078  -0.065  -0.207  -0.038  -0.235 
Optical & Nuclear  (0.226)  (0.224)  (0.222)  (0.223)  (0.224)  (0.225)  (0.216) 
               
Mechanicals  -0.059  -0.140  -0.105  -0.062  -0.183  -0.063  -0.272 
  (0.239)  (0.238)  (0.235)  (0.235)  (0.236)  (0.237)  (0.228) 36 
               
Table 3 (continued)               
               
year= 1990  -0.048  -0.036  -0.009  -0.047  -0.030  -0.061  -0.005 
  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.044)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
               
year= 1991  -0.043  -0.033  -0.002  -0.037  -0.023  -0.028  0.038 
  (0.042)  (0.041)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.042)  (0.042)  (0.042) 
               
year= 1992  -0.072
*  -0.066
*  -0.028  -0.061  -0.069
*  -0.092
**  -0.042 
  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.041)  (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.040)  (0.041) 
               
year= 1993  -0.080
**  -0.070
*  -0.050  -0.079
**  -0.067
*  -0.071  -0.023 
  (0.037)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.038)  (0.037)  (0.037) 
               
year= 1994  -0.063  -0.054  -0.032  -0.065  -0.058  -0.061  -0.026 
  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.037)  (0.036)  (0.036) 








  (0.365)  (0.361)  (0.357)  (0.385)  (0.355)  (0.365)  (0.369) 









  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.024) 









  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Observations  349  349  349  349  349  349  349 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
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Endnotes: 
 
i In some areas, Cisco concentrated its outsourcing even more sharply: from 13 to 4 suppliers in EMS (electronics 
manufacturing services), and from 20 suppliers to just 3 in ASICs (application-specific integrated circuits). While 
Cisco’s changes in supply portfolio concentration were wide-ranging and spanned multiple areas, we focus on 
narrower domains where all the outsourcing is for the “same type” of knowledge-based work (e.g., ASIC design). 
 
ii See http://www.bea.gov/industry/gdpbyind_data.htm (accessed 6/4/10). 
 
iii  Manufacturing often entails significant scale economies and large fixed-cost investments in equipment or 
engineering, which can be key drivers of outsourcing decisions. Furthermore, suppliers or buyers may sometimes 
enjoy significant market power in manufacturing, such that there is little autonomy to choose among exchange 
partners. In knowledge-based services however, scale advantages, fixed-cost investments, and market power are all 
quite limited, and thus each new activity or project can typically be outsourced to one of several different suppliers.  
 
iv In the patent context, for example, evaluating patent (legal) quality is quite costly and imperfect, especially in the 
unclear and abstract stage when a patent is newly issued. Firms typically only use independent patent attorneys to 
evaluate patents when litigation is a looming possibility (i.e., quite rarely), and at considerable expense. 
 
v The intuition behind adjusting the HHI in this way derives simply from the fact that an HHI is a Euclidean distance 
based on fraction (or share) vectors that reside along N orthogonal axes. Relatedness implies that the axes are in fact 
not orthogonal, and correlation is a natural way to measure the “angle” between them. 
 
vi One concern from an empirical perspective is that conflicts of interest may not give firms latitude in choosing 
suppliers for legal services. However, we found that law firms routinely perform patent prosecution services for 
multiple clients; even within a relatively narrow technological domain (we found this to be the case at the 4-, 7- and 
10-digit IPC level). However, conflicts of interest may add some noise – on the margin – to our dependent variable; 
which militates against finding support for our hypotheses. We thus perform a somewhat conservative test. 